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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVII
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO A CORPORATION-THE CURRENT EVOLUTION OF
AN "ACCEPTED" RULE OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The utilization of the attorney-client privilege by corporations in
litigation has been an accepted assumption by the courts and the pro-
fession for many years.' Only recently, in the case of Radiant Burners
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,2 has a court questioned the validity of the
privilege's application to the corporate entity. In the months subsequent
to this decision several courts have been confronted with the question of
whether or not the corporation is entitled to claim the attorney-client
privilege.
In Radiant Burners the Illinois district court held that the attorney-
client privilege was a personal one and therefore not applicable to the
corporation. The court suggested that its holding be accepted by the
profession as the general rule of law. In the second case, City of Phila-
delphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,' a federal district court in Penn-
sylvania, while assuming that Radiant Burners' premise was historically
sound, refused to follow that decision. It said that the privilege's
applicability to corporations was "so generally accepted" it was forced
to recognize its existence. In the third case, United States v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co.,4 the New Jersey district court held that Radiant
Burners was not applicable since the court was bound under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a) to follow a New Jersey rule of evidence
which recognizes the right of corporations to claim the privilege in
courts of general jurisdiction of that state. A fourth case, Garrison v.
General Motors Corp.,4" in rejecting Radiant Burners, has followed the
rationale of the Westinghouse case.
1. "It is generally assumed that corporations and other legal entities are entitled to the
privilege just as much as individuals are. The idea seems to go unchallenged-perhaps be-
cause in law, as in life, many of the most deeply believed assumptions are unspoken. Indeed,
one can imagine the response of the surprised practitioner to any suggestion that it be
otherwise: 'Why should a corporation not be entitled to the privilege? Cannot a corpora-
tion sue and be sued? Is it not punishable for its crimes? Does it not need legal advice of
its own? How could it go about getting such advice if its confidences were not respected?
It is an ancient rule that a master is privileged to consult with counsel through his servant,
a principal through his agent-why not a corporation in the same way?'" Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956). See Ellis-
Foster Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1958); Radio
Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954) ; United States v. United States
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); Stewart Equip. Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super.
15, 107 A.2d 527 (1954); United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del.
1943) ; Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
2. 207 F. Supp. 771, upheld on reconsideration, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
3. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
4. 31 U.S.L. WEK 2325 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 1962).
4a. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2394 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1963).
COMMENTS
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the attorney-
client privilege, to investigate its characterization by the Radiant Burners
court as a personal privilege, and to analyze and attempt to determine
the value in future litigation of the positions taken by the courts in the
series of cases which rejected the holding of Radiant Burners.
THE HISTORY AND ELEMENTS OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is traceable to 16th century England.5
Its precise origin is not known although some scholars suggest it is a
derivative of the Roman concept of "fides." 6 The privilege at common
law applied to "whatever is communicated professionally by a client
to his legal adviser in confidence, and with the view of obtaining pro-
fessional assistance or legal guidance." 7
This common law view of the privilege has been restated by Pro-
fessor Wigmore in a rule providing for the application of the privilege:'
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a pro-
fessional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the com-
munications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
In determining whether the corporation can meet these requirements,
the major issues are whether a corporation is a client under the rule and
if so, whether it can ever achieve the secrecy demanded in order for
the privilege to apply, considering the size of corporate employment
today.
THE RATIONALE OF RADIANT BURNERS
The basis of the Radiant Burners decision is that the attorney-
client privilege is a personal one and therefore should be denied to the
corporation, as has been the right against self-incrimination.9 The court
5. The earliest English cases dealing with the attorney-client privilege are Dennis v.
Codrington, Cary 100, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580); Kelway v. Kelway, Cary 89, 21 Eng.
Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580); Austin v. Vesey, Cary 63, 21 Eng. Rep. 34 (Ch. 1577); Berd v. Love-
lace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577).
6. This concept of family loyalty was held to preclude family members from testifying
since they would more likely lie than be subject to the disapproval of the community for
betraying this primary trust. The concept was extended to the counsel and his client. See
HAGEIAX, PRIVILEGED COa-UNICAnONs As A BRANCH OF LEOAL EVIDENCE § 13, at 9 (1889) ;
McCoR cICK, EVIDENCE 182 (1954); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications
Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928).
7. Hageman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, § 237 (16th ed. 1899);
3 JoNEs, EVIDENCE, § 828 (5th ed. 1958) ; 1 STARKIE, EVIDENCE, 228-232 (1837).
8. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
9. The corporation was denied the right against self-incrimination in Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
also contended that even if the corporation could qualify as a client, it
still could not claim the privilege since the rights of all interest holders
to inspect the corporate records constituted a "profanation" of any
alleged confidence the corporation claimed in its legal dealings.
THE NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The court's holding that the client must be a natural person goes
to the very nature of the privilege. Is it a personal right of protection
from coercion or is it an aid in the administration of justice? In United
States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 1° the Supreme Court said:
The desirability of protecting confidential communications
between attorney and client as a matter of public policy is too
well known and has been too often recognized by text-books and
courts to need extended comment now. If such communica-
tions were required to be made subject to examination and
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition
upon professional advice and assistance. °a
This evidentiary privilege has been occasionally criticized on the
abstract level as allowing concealment of facts which, if not so pro-
tected, might be used to bring offenders to prosecution." However, its
unquestioned acceptance based upon practical policy reasons is attested
to by innumerable decisions throughout Anglo-American case law.'"
This protection accorded the client is based upon the recognition
that in a complex 'society expert legal advice is essential. As stated in the
Model Code of Evidence:' 3
To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty
of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To induce
clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent
their later disclosure is said to be a necessity. The social good
derived from the proper performance of the functions of law-
yers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm
that may come from the suppression of the evidence in
specific cases.
10. 236 U.S. 318 (1915).
10a. Id. at 336.
11. "This being the professed object of the English system of law,-viz., the prevention
of offences,--is it reconcilable to the idea of wisdom or consistency, that it should lay down
a rule, the effect of which, without contributing to the protection of the innocent . . . is
purely and simply to counteract its own designs?" 7 THE WoRKs OF JEREmY BENTHAM 475
(Bowring ed. 1962).
12. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891) ; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464
(1888); Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280 (1826) ; Parish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254
(1856) ; Stephens v. Mattox, 37 Ga. 289 (1867) ; Doherty v. O'Callaghan, 157 Mass. 90, 31
N.E. 726 (1892); Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394 (1880); Anderson v. Bank [1876], 2 Ch. D.
644; Greenough v. Gaskell, I Myl. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833).
13. MODEL CODE Or EVIhENCE rule 210(a) (1942).
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Thus, it would appear that there is little basis for characterizing
the attorney-client privilege as a personal one. Rather, the historical
thrust of the privilege is directed towards the efficient and proper admin-
istration of justice.
THE ELEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The question of whether the agents of a corporation can attain
the element of confidentiality should, it seems, be determined on a
basis comparable to that used at common law in extending the privilege's
circle of secrecy to qualified agents of both the client14 and the
attorney.15
Obviously, all interest holders do not have an unbridled right
to inspect corporate records. This right of inspection can be challenged
if it is not for good cause. It has been suggested that when a stockholder
brings an adverse claim against the corporation, he should be treated as
an outsider acting in a personal capacity. Thus, he would only come
within the bounds of the privilege when acting in "coordination" with
the directors."
Several standards have been advanced to determine whether an
agent of the corporation is qualified to represent it in its legal dealings.
These include conferring confidentiality by rank in the corporation or
upon the person who is the "logical" one to transmit the information
to the attorney in a given situation. 7 In the Westinghouse" case,
Judge Kilpatrick discarded the previous methods utilized and proposed
what he considered a better approach:
14. Lalance & Grosjhan Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1898);
Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931); Schmitt v. Emery,
211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng. Rep. 558
(1851).
15. Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 7 So. 302 (1890); Sibley v. Waffle, 16 N.Y. 180 (1857);
Hunt v. Taylor, 22 Vt. 556 (1850) ; Taylor v. Foster, 2 C. & P. 195 (1825).
16. Simon, supra note 1, at 967-8.
17. "Generally, with respect to the confidential nature of the disclosure and the
status of the corporate employee making the disclosure, I think corporate counsel's
largest problem is the education of second level management personnel who, for
some reason or other, believe that a company, like the government, cannot be
efficiently run unless everyone, including the building custodian, personnel manager,
and of course the comptroller, indiscriminately receive copies of all documents
prepared by the legal department and unless several surplus people sit in on con-
ferences involving legal matters. Some reference has been made in an article en-
titled 'The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953
as to whether the person making the disclosure is a 'managing agent,' 'communicating
agent,' or 'source agent.' I realize 8 WIGmORE, EViDENCE § 2317 (3d ed. 1940)
furnishes a basis for such characterizations, but this would appear to be an
artificial test. The safe and reasonable guide is whether the discloser is the logical
person, in the circumstances of each factual situation, to make the communication,
under the necessity of obtaining legal advice for the protection or defence of
corporate legal rights." Reddy, Practical Guides for the Preservation of Attorney-
Client Privilege Within A Corporation, PROCEEDINGS AT THE FIRST ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 78 (Fordham U. School of L. 1959).
18. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
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[T] he most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the employee
making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in the
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon
the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of
a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is
(or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure
...and the privilege should apply. In all other cases the em-
ployee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to
enable the latter to advise those in the corporation having the
authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice.' 9
This "control" standard has been subsequently adopted by the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of California in the Garrison
case.20 In that case the court held that communications between patent
attorneys of a corporation and the "control group"" were protected by
the privilege.22
Which of these proposed standards is preferable is a matter of
conjecture. But they are means which can be utilized to prevent whole-
sale profanation of privileged communications, thus preserving the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation. An
awareness of the possibilities of maintaining confidentiality in legal
communications is reflected by the movement of corporate counsels to
tighten internal working rules among the corporation's employees.23
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC REJECTS RADIANT BURNERS
In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,24 Judge Kil-
patrick in a brief "preliminary" remark rejected Radiant Burners:
19. Id. at 485.
20. Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 31 U.S.L. WEEx 2394 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1962).
21. The court held that this control group consisted of officers, directors and department
heads of the corporation.
22. The court specified that the communication must be related to patent information
with respect to which the corporation reasonably believes legal advice is necessary.
23. One writer's suggested definition of the attorney-client privilege as applicable to
corporate house counsel, based upon cases dealing with the various elements of the com-
mon law definition where corporations were involved would be: "Where an attorney at
law, or an employee under his supervision, in a corporate legal department receives or
sends a communication, from or to another employee of the same corporation, which com-
munications were sent or received solely for the purpose of, or as the result of, the ap-
plication of legal skill, knowledge or training to the subject matter of the communication,
such communication shall be privileged provided its distribution within the corporation, its
filing and handling are consistent with the confidential nature of such material and is
limited to those employees required to have knowledge thereof for the securing, enforcement
or preservation of some legal right of the corporation or relates to the defense of the
corporation against a claim, or set of facts which reasonably may give rise to a claim, under
the law." Reddy, note 17 supra, at 75-76. The author also outlines a suggested set of
internal working rules to be adopted to protect the privilege. Id., at 85-6.
24. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
COMMENTS
His opinion [Judge Campbell's in Radiant Burners] is
supported by a good deal of history and sound logic but the
availability of the privilege to corporations has gone un-
challenged so long and has been so generally accepted that
I must recognize that it does exist.
2 5
This refusal to follow Radiant Burners, even under the belief that
its historical basis might be valid, illustrates the strength of the assump-
tion which the Radiant Burners court challenged. Regardless of the cor-
rectness or incorrectness of Radiant Burners' basic premise that the at-
torney-client privilege is historically a personal one, the realities of
modern day society make the decision difficult for both bench and bar to
accept.
When the public policy basis of fostering the proper administration
of justice is considered, it is apparent there is probably a greater need
for the corporation to have the benefit of the privilege than the indi-
vidual. The broad scope and complexity of corporate affairs require the
constant attention and guidance of effective legal counsel in the fullest
sense if these organizations are to function properly. To deprive the
corporation of the privilege would serve only to discourage full and
honest disclosure by its agents to the attorney, thus preventing him from
performing his vital function.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION-POssIBLE MIDDLE GROUND?
The holdings of the first two decisions discussed are diametrically
opposed. Either the court rejects the corporation's claim to the privilege
entirely or recognizes it and applies it whenever the requisites are
attained by the corporation. A possible middle ground was used in
Jackson v. Pillsbury,28 where the court utilized its discretion as to
whether the communication would be regarded as privileged. The test
adopted was that "the resultant injury to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of the litigation.i
27
The wisdom of accepting a discretionary approach as to the ap-
plicability of the privilege, whether it be in favor of the natural person or
the corporation, is questionable considering the purpose of the privilege.
It is arguable that this would weaken the client's confidence in the
attorney since there is no longer an absolute guarantee of silence.
Thus, it would seem that the privilege cannot be made discretionary
without endangering its effectiveness.28 It is clear that there is no
middle ground between Radiant Burners and Westinghouse Electric.
25. Id. at 484.
26. 380I1. 554, 44 N.E.2d 537 (1942).
27. Id. at 576, 44 N.E.2d at 547.
28. See note 35 infra.
1963]
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The courts must decide if the corporation is or is not entitled to the
attorney-client privilege unless there is a state statute to decide the
question for them. However, this raises some basic questions as to the
classification of the privilege as substantive or procedural when a federal
court is involved.
STATE STATUTE AS A BAR TO RADIANT BURNERS
In United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,29 the final case under
consideration, the court held that the New Jersey Evidence Act of 1960,
which defines a client30 as a person, corporation or association, was
binding on it as well as the state courts:
It would be very strange indeed were this federal court to de-
prive a litigant before it of the protection afforded by the state
statute. Since the Legislature of this State has spoken, there
is no 'statute or rule' authorizing the disregard of the privilege.
On the contrary, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, without which the plaintiff would be disentitled to
inspection or copying of documents, expressly provides that only
documents which are not privileged may be subject to that
form of discovery. In sum, the New Jersey Legislature has set
at rest any doubt respecting the persistence of the attorney-
client privilege, and its availability to a corporate litigant in
this State. Since the privilege exists in favor of the defendant
corporation under the New Jersey statute the documents
which the plaintiff seeks to examine are protected not only by
those provisions of Rule 34, but by those of Rule 43(a) as
well.3
1
While rule 43(a) states that the federal courts must be governed
by the state statute or rule which favors the admissibility of evidence,8"
Professor Moore advocates that a federal court be given latitude in
determining whether a matter does in fact come within the scope of the
29. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2325 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 1962).
30. The Model Code of Evidence defines client similarly: "[A] person or corporation
or other association that, directly or through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer
or the lawyer's representative for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal
service from him in his professional capacity . . . ." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 209(a)
(1942).
31. United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2325, 2326 (D.N.J.
Dec. 31, 1962).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) states: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted
which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence
heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or
under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most
convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner."
[VOL. XVII
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state statutes and decisions even though the court looks to the state's
interpretation of the word "privileged.)
33
The question of whether a privilege is a substantive or procedural
matter has caused disagreement. Moore contends that the privilege is
a procedural matter, not being one that "by its nature must substantially
affect the outcome of a case." '34 This view is utilized by some federal
courts, as evidenced by the trend towards broadening the discovery
process at the expense of various privileges including that of attorney-
client.3 5 The state courts have not followed the federal pattern, at least
in regard to the attorney-client privilege, if the requisites of the privilege
can be satisfied.3"
Those who view privilege as a substantive right abhor the treat-
ment of the various privileges as simply exclusionary rules. The sup-
porters of this view demand that federal courts apply the State privilege
law in diversity cases and in certain federal question cases. 37
CONCLUSION
The suggestion by the court in Radiant Burners that its view be
adopted by the profession as the general rule of law has not met with
success in its initial tests, as illustrated in the Westinghouse, Becton and
Garrison cases. It is highly likely that the historical, practical and pro-
cedural aspects mentioned above will be relied upon by other courts to
reject the Radiant Burners holding.
While practical policy reasons should be the major motivation of
the courts to reject Radiant Burners, the historical basis should not be
overlooked in holding that the corporation is-entitled to the attorney-
client privilege. While Radiant Burners may be an example of ill-
considered law, the action of the court in Westinghouse Electric in failing
to investigate the validity of Radiant Burners' basic premise is an example
of judicial shortcuts that result in arbitrary law-making. While the
analogy to the right of self-incrimination might have been logical, the
premise upon which it depends is not supported by a "good deal of
33. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.23(9), at 1483 (2d ed. 1956).
34. Id. at 1484.
35. The following Ohio cases illustrate the tendency of the federal courts to expand the
discovery process at the expense of the attorney-client privilege: Brookshire v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Humphries v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 177
(N.D. Ohio 1953); Pannella v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
36. The following state cases show a tendency to protect the attorney-client privilege
from the discovery process if the requisite elements have been satisfied: Seaboard Airline
Ry. v. Timmons, 61 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1952); Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699,
249 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1931); Ex parte Shoup, 154 Ohio St. 221, 94 N.E.2d 625 (1950); In re
Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949); In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d
224 (1948).
37. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privilege in Federal Court, 31
Tux. L. REv. 101 (1956-57).
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history." There is no effective substitute for legal analysis in our
judicial system.
Although the existence of a right may be widely assumed, is it
conducive to good law to uphold it without investigating the validity
of the legal analysis utilized by another court in attacking the assump-
tion? One may argue that the assumption is so strong that the process of
legal analysis is unnecessary. But who is to judge the strength of any
assumption?
The effectiveness of a state statute in circumventing Radiant
Burners will be largely discretionary with the courts. That is, if a
court chooses to follow the views of Professor Moore referred to above,
it may curtail or negate the effect of a state statute which permits the
corporation to assert the attorney-client privilege. Conversely, a strict
application of Rule 43(a) or the acceptance of the substantive view of
privilege in conjunction with the Erie doctrine would give full force
and effect to that type of statute.
While the chances are remote that Radiant Burners will be adopted
as the general rule of law,"' this series of cases and those which
will follow illustrate the influences which operate in the evolution of a
corpus of law. Where before there was merely an assumption, there is
now taking shape a fiber of law, the outlines of which are discernible.
WALTER WAYNE SYLVESTER
38. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized the public policy basis of
the privilege in Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942).
The court stated that "the rule . . . is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and ad-
ministration of justice, that persons seeking legal aid and counsel should be free to com-
municate with their confidential adviser about the subject matter of their problem without
fear of consequences or apprehension of disclosure."
The Florida Supreme Court placed emphasis on the sanctity of the ancient privilege
and its public policy basis in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Timmons, 61 So.2d 426, 428
(Fla. 1952). The court stated that "even if the plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to justify
setting aside a release, which question is not before us, he has not stated sufficient facts to
justify drawing aside the veil of secrecy surrounding an attorney's legal advice to his clients.
The plaintiff's sole reason for requesting the confidential communication between the
defendant and its attorney is that 'such documents contain or may contain evidence
relevant and material to the matter involved in this action.' The confidential relationship of
attorney and client is a sacred one, and one that is indispensable to the administration of
justice. It cannot so lightly be brushed aside." One may well wonder if the court's language
that the privilege "cannot so lightly be brushed aside" implies that Florida might follow
the discretionary approach utilized in Jackson v. Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 44 N.E.2d 537
(1942), discussed with text accompanying notes 26-27 supra, if the reason for disclosure
might seem more definite and vital to the outcome of the case.
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